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Abstract 
This paper has two ambitions. First, we review the economic literature on tax 
coordination. Second, we argue that the taxation of capital is not an issue of 
efficiency, but instead an issue of equity. In particular, capital tax coordination can 
alter the vertical distribution of income between the production factors capital and 
labour. Capital is in perfectly elastic supply in a small open economy. Therefore the 
tax incidence falls to the immobile factor, labour. By contrast, capital is in inelastic 
supply at the international level, and therefore the capital tax incidence falls 
completely on capital, without welfare losses of taxation.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is the ambition of this paper to review the literature on tax coordination with a 
special emphasis on distributional consequences. The literature is divided on its view 
of tax coordination. One strand of literature emphasises the importance of tax 
competition to induce efficiency in an international setting. Another strand of literature 
focuses on the inefficiencies associated with tax competition, and suggests tax 
harmonization as a possible solution. 
Instead of discussing these two strands of literature separately, it turns out that we 
can discuss it by answering a series of questions. First, we ask if we need capital 
taxation? Second, we ask why we need capital taxation? Third, we ask why capital 
income taxes are set too low? Forth, we ask why capital income taxes are set to 
high? Finally, we ask which form of tax coordination could improve welfare? These 
five questions should allow us to review the papers and understand why the two 
authors draw divergent conclusions. 
 
2. Do we need capital taxation? 
With the exception of Pigovian taxes to mitigate economic distortions, taxes are a 
means to collect revenue for government expenditures. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to investigate the latter, and in line with the literature (and the two authors) we 
shall therefore assume that governments need to raise a given amount of revenue. 
The question then is, which taxes should governments levy? All taxes introduce 
distortions in the economy, which should be avoided. For a given amount of revenue, 
the distortion due to the income effect will be identical1. Therefore an optimal tax 
system should minimize the distortions due to the substitution effect2. The only taxes 
that do not trigger a substitution effect are lump-sum or poll taxes. Lump-sum taxes 
can for instance be levied per person or per unit of existing capital income. If levied 
per person, lump-sum taxes are extremely regressive, and therefore rejected by most 
governments on distributional grounds3. Lump-sum taxes could in principle also be 
levied per unit of existing capital, as this would not influence future investment 
decisions. A government that would engage in such a practice once could not be 
trusted not to use the practice again, so that investors expect future taxes on capital, 
which tends to reduce capital accumulation4. Feld (2005) notes, that the problem is 
similar to a hold-up problem that has been well analyzed in the industrial organization 
literature. He argues that unless governments can commit, or firms can move capital 
costless after installation, the first best solution has to be discarded, and we have to 
focus on second best solutions. 
The theory of optimal taxation suggests a set of consumption taxes that minimizes 
the excess burden of taxation (Stiglitz, 2000). As distortions are larger for goods in 
elastic supply and demand, it turns out that the optimal tax rate is inversely 
proportional to the price elasticities. Taxes on products that are inelastic in demand 
should therefore be taxed higher. The theory suggests that apart from consumption 
taxes, only profits5 should be completely taxed away. In particular, the theory 
                                                 
1 Taxes reduce the income of individuals, who can therefore consume less. 
2 A tax on a particular good changes relative prices, which distorts consumption decisions. 
3 Indeed, lump-sum taxes levied on persons are not as innocent as they appear, as they do distort fertility 
decisions, even if children are tax exempt. 
4 In principle, governments could levy future capital taxes based on the capital stock existing in a given initial 
year, say 2005. In a closed economy, this would allow lump-sum taxation based on wealth. In an open economy, 
capital owners have an incentive to leave the economy (and it would require a capital flight tax equivalent to the 
discounted stream of future taxes on capital to prevent this - the tax on capital for the capital flight tax has to be 
at least has high as the capital income tax).  
5 Profits are seen as the result of an inefficient market setting of imperfect competition. 
suggests that capital does not need to be taxed, as consumption can fully replicate 
capital taxes. 
The argument is simple to develop. Suppose an individual earns income E in the first 
period, and spends it on first period and second period consumption, C1 and C2 
respectively. Consumption is taxed each period, and income not spent in the first 
period yields interest r. The individual's budget constraint therefore reads: 
E = (1 + t1)C1 + (1 + t2)C2/(1 + r). 
Rearranging this equation to get an expression in second period income, we obtain: 
C2 = (1 + t1 - t2)(1 + r)[E/(1 + t1) - C1]. 
Income divided by first period taxes is net income. Net income minus first period 
consumption is wealth. Multiplied by the interest factor (1 + r) gives wealth and 
income from wealth. The first parenthesis in the above equation is therefore the tax 
on wealth and wealth income. it is positive if t1 > t2 and negative otherwise. 
Therefore, no capital income taxation is required, as consumption taxes can fully 
replicate a capital tax. (Nowotny, 1999) 
There is an even stronger efficiency argument against capital taxation in open 
economies. In the context of open economies, we typically assume that capital is 
mobile internationally, but in fixed supply at the global level. Labour, by contrast, is 
considered to be in fixed supply nationally. On a particular national capital market, 
this implies a horizontal supply curve (at the global interest rate r), and a conventional 
falling demand schedule, due to the law of the diminishing marginal product of 
capital. Optimality implies that the marginal product of capital (mpk) equals the world 
interest rate.  
 
 
Countries that levy a capital tax of t alter the optimality condition to mpk = r + t. The 
net return to capital mpk - t still equals the global interest rate. With a diminishing 
marginal product of capital, this implies a lower capital stock6. (Sinn, 2003) 
In terms of welfare, there is no surplus to capital owners nationally, as the supply of 
capital is equal to the net return earned. As firms would be willing to pay a higher 
price for the first units of capital than the interest rate, firms make a surplus, which is 
distributed to workers under perfect competition. A tax on capital will earn the same 
net return to capital. However, the surplus going to labour will decline. It will decline 
by more than the tax revenue, as the demand schedule has a negative slope. Hence, 
workers suffer more from a capital tax than from a tax on labour. If we only consider 
the national capital market, we could draw the premature conclusion that capital 
taxes in an international environment have negative distributional consequences.  
                                                 
6 In contrast to common believe, an increase in capital taxation does not imply a complete flight of capital. The 
amount of capital leaving the economy depends on the output elasticity of capital, which is typically less than 
unity, i.e. a one percent increase in t reduces K by less than one percent. 
r
K1
Supply 
K
MPK
MPK
 
 
3. Why do we need capital taxation? 
Minimizing distortions, as suggested by the above theory of optimal taxation is 
equivalent to minimizing the excess burden of taxation. In so doing, the theory 
ignores distributional consequences. In particular, it suggests the highest tax rates for 
inelastic goods, which tend to be necessities most consumed by poor individuals, 
whereas it suggests to tax elastic goods least, which conforms to consumption 
patterns of the rich. As shown above, it also implies taxing first period consumption 
higher than second period consumption (t1 > t2), which implies that young individuals 
should be taxed higher than old individuals. If young individuals are poorer than old, it 
also exhibits negative intergenerational distributional implications. 
If we wish to include distributional considerations in taxation7, we need to resort to a 
third best policy. In such a policy, capital taxation can be an important instrument to 
redistribute income vertically from capital to labour. If wealth correlates with income 
(as it empirically does), capital taxation can also contribute to the interpersonal or 
horizontal redistribution of income.  
This suggests that in a closed economy, the predominant argument for capital 
taxation is redistribution. We cannot immediately carry this argument forward to the 
                                                 
7 In a pure neoclassical economy, distribution is a non-issue. Production factors are rewarded according to their 
respective marginal product, and interpersonal differences in wealth are due to individual choice, in particular 
over patience, only. 
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open economy, as we have previously shown that workers actually suffer from a 
capital tax increase in a particular country. However, if capital is indeed in inelastic 
supply globally (which it is at least in the short run), then the surplus to capital owners 
is equal to the total revenue, or rK (in the graph below, both areas shaded in grey). 
Hence capital owners do earn rents in the open economy.  
 
If all countries introduce a tax on capital, the net interest rate would fall globally to r - 
t. The surplus to owners of capital would fall to the area shaded in dark grey, and tax 
revenue would equal the area in light grey. Total surplus in the economy would not 
change. Under globally perfectly inelastic supply of capital, capital taxation would not 
generate any excess burden. This would not be the case if we tax labour. Hence 
internationally capital income taxation still enables the redistribution of income. But it 
required the joint efforts of all countries, or tax coordination. Both the theory of 
optimal taxation and the international taxation of capital therefore come to the 
conclusion that capital taxation is allocatively inefficient, but improves equity within an 
economy. We should therefore tax capital predominantly because it improves the 
distribution of income. 
The literature discusses distributional consequences at the margins. Feld (2005) 
discusses the impact of migration (rich individuals move to countries with low taxes 
and low social transfers, whereas poor people would move in the opposite direction. 
He also acknowledges the fact that public expenditure will shift from welfare 
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expenditures to infrastructure expenditures. He notes that "firms supposedly benefit 
more heavily" from "a shift from social transfers to infrastructural spending".  
There is an empirical for both the migration hypothesis, and finds little evidence in 
Europe, and the redistribution issue. Winner (2004) notes that in 23 OECD countries 
and the time period 1965 to 2000, capital mobility shifts the tax burden from capital 
taxation to labour taxes. This clearly implies a deterioration in income distribution. 
Feld (2005) presents a lot of evidence for Switzerland, where apparently tax 
competition among cantons does not induce a decline in the Swiss welfare state. He 
uses this as evidence to refute the redistributional argument on empirical grounds. In 
passing, he notes however, that "there is some redistribution at the federal level".  
The European Union so far has no tax privileges. Still, there is some redistribution 
within Europe, particularly through structural and cohesion funds. However, these 
allow for redistribution only from rich regions in Europe to poor regions, but do not 
allow for intra-national redistribution. Moreover, they are quantitatively insignificant 
and certainly cannot replace redistribution through taxes and social transfers as 
undergone by EU member states. It is of course illusionary to imagine the European 
Union to ever redistribute enough income to satisfy the needs of the people (similar 
to Swiss cantons today), so that indeed tax competition could lead to an outcome 
that does not correspond to the will of the people.  
 
4. Why are capital income taxes set too low? 
The previous chapter has concluded that the reason to coordination capital income 
taxation is predominantly an issue of income redistribution. Vertical redistribution 
implies that rich capital owners should pay part of welfare expenses. And, of course, 
firms should pay for public infrastructure that improves capital productivity. We will 
now ask under which conditions capital contributes to the financing of the welfare 
state, and under which conditions they pay too little taxes. 
Suppose public infrastructure is an impure public good with congestion. Private 
marginal costs to firms of using public infrastructure (C) depends positively on the 
size of the firm (K), and negatively on the amount of infrastructure provided (G). With 
internationally mobile capital, profit maximization implies  
mpk = r + t + C(K, G).  
A benevolent government would maximize income of its citizens, which equals  
E = Y – r(K – A) - KC(K, G) – G,  
where Y is output, A is domestic assets, and r(K – A) is interest income going abroad. 
If a country is a net exporter of capital, this term would be negative. KC(K, G) are 
total user costs of public infrastructure, and G is the amount of public goods provided. 
With a constant world interest rate and a diminishing marginal product of capital, the 
tax rate and the capital stock are inversely related, so that we can let governments 
maximize income with respect to capital and infrastructure expenditures. The first 
order condition with respect to capital yields  
mpk = r + C(K, G) + K (dC/dK).  
Comparing this with the firm's optimality condition, we find that the optimal capital 
income tax equals t* = K (dC/dK). The optimal tax rate is equal to the elasticity of 
user cost with respect to capital multiplied by the marginal cost for using the public 
infrastructure. The first order condition with respect to infrastructure yields –K(dC/dG) 
= 1. This implies that the usage cost of the public good should equal the marginal 
cost of provision, which is unity. (Sinn, 2003) 
Clearly, this simple model identifies government expenditures and government 
revenues separately. Hence the two need not necessarily match. In order to identify 
whether capital taxation generates a surplus, which could be used to finance part of 
the welfare state, we invoke Euler's theorem, which reads  
K(dC/dK) + G(dC/dG) = xC, 
where x is degree of homogeneity (scale factor) in the usage cost function of public 
infrastructure. Substituting the two first order conditions for the derivatives, we find tK 
– G = xCK. Hence, capital taxation yields a surplus if and only if the scale factor is 
positive. A tax on capital can finance public infrastructure only when the usage cost 
function does not have a negative degree of homogeneity. A public good with a 
positive scale factor is a club good, and can be financed entirely through membership 
fees. By contrast, most public goods exhibit economies of scale. In our example, this 
would be the case if a small increase in G leads to a large decline in costs, whereas 
a small reduction in usage (K) changes costs only little. Most public goods exhibit this 
property. 
Starting from a capital tax rate that represents preferences over redistribution, 
governments have an incentive to reduce the capital tax rate. If other countries don't 
react, this reduction would lure in additional capital, leading to an increase in 
revenues. However, other countries have the same incentive to reduce tax rates, 
leading to tax competition below the socially preferable level, and in case of public 
goods with scale economies, even below self-financing of public infrastructure. This 
is the essence of the fiscal externality present with tax competition. Not only would 
workers have to bear the entire cost of the welfare state, they would also have to 
bear part of the infrastructure costs. Therefore, tax competition may not only be 
negative for equity considerations, but also from an efficiency perspective. (Sinn, 
2003) 
A number of arguments beyond the simple model of capital tax competition with 
public infrastructure presented above have been discussed in the literature. Zodrow 
(2003) notes that tax competition can lead perfectly identical regions to inefficiently 
specialize in different activities, simply because they implement a different mix of 
capital taxation and infrastructure expenditures. He also notes that capital taxation 
can be a (weak) alternative to profit taxation, if the latter is not available due to 
transfer pricing. He finally notes that international public goods would reduce the 
incentive to compete over tax rates, as the productivity of one economy now depends 
on the amount of infrastructure provided by the other, and therefore on the amount of 
tax revenue levied by the foreign government. Lars Feld (2005) touches on the issue 
when discussing regional spillovers. He makes the point that regional spillovers could 
work in the opposite direction, if the foreign public good gets congested by domestic 
citizens. Whereas international public goods should reduce the incentive to 
coordinate capital taxation, regional spillovers may enforce the incentive to 
coordinate. 
 
5. Why are capital income taxes set too high? 
Clearly, the above analysis has assumed that governments behave optimally when 
setting policy. However, optimality was constrained, as each government would have 
taken decisions of other governments as given. Fully benevolent governments would 
get together and coordinate on a level of taxation, or a tax policy, which would ensure 
that at least all public infrastructure is financed through taxes on capital income. 
However, as Stiglitz (2000) has stated, good government is scarce public good. And 
this argument is frequently mentioned with respect to tax coordination. “The state 
does not always do what it ought to do. Political actors follow their own self-interest 
and seek to get rents from the political process.” (Feld, 2005) 
Even if we start out from a situation of tax competition with fiscal externalities, raising 
tax rates may not necessarily improve welfare. As Keen and Edwards (1996) have 
demonstrated, capital taxation will only increase welfare for the citizens under certain 
conditions. In particular, tax coordination improves welfare through an income effect 
which internalizes the fiscal externality, implying higher revenue from capital taxation 
and a higher level of public expenditures. Tax coordination reduces welfare due to a 
substitution effect (or relative price effect), which identifies how much of the welfare 
gain the policymaker is able to divert from private welfare to rents. If the negative 
substitution effect outweighs the positive income effect, tax coordination may be 
inefficient from the beginning. Selfish policymakers will agree coordination measures 
until they can no longer extract private rents. Capital taxation among selfish 
policymakers may therefore almost certainly end up with capital taxes too high. 
The literature is divided on the issue. Some authors suggest that rent seeking of 
policymaker is indeed a crucial problem, and competition among policymakers, in 
particular over capital taxation, could improve welfare. Others, by contrast, have a 
more positive view on policymakers. For instance, Genser (2005) clearly states his 
belief "that there is room for further coordination which properly implemented should 
be beneficial to the member states". 
 
6. Which form of tax coordination could improve welfare? 
For the reasons mentioned above, there may be too much or too little capital 
taxation. Either way, tax coordination can be justified both on efficiency grounds and 
on distributional grounds. However, depending on the motivation for tax coordination, 
different regimes of coordination will be implemented. If capital taxation is 
coordinated in order to internalize fiscal externalities, we can expect countries to 
suffer from similar levels of externalities, and therefore a similar increase in tax rates 
will be supported. Even if tax coordination is due to rent-seeking politicians, we would 
expect similar behaviour of politicians in similar constitutional systems (Janeba and 
Schjelderup, 2002), and therefore again similar increase in tax rates will be 
supported. However, if tax coordination is aspired in order to alter the vertical 
distribution, we would expect countries with different preferences for equality to target 
different capital tax rates, rendering tax coordination more difficult. 
There has been a sequence of proposals in the European Union to coordinate capital 
taxation, starting from the Neumark report (1962), followed by the Van den Tempel 
report (1970), the CIT Draft Directive, the Ruding report (1992), and finally the 
Bolkestein report (2001). We may speculate that the reason that policymakers could 
not agree was not so much the existence of market inefficiencies or the consequence 
of the political economy, but that agreement over the size of redistribution could not 
be reached because of differences in the underlying preference structure.  
We can find support for this hypothesis in Feld (2005), who concludes: “Whilst [fiscal 
competition] does apparently not lead to any efficiency problems at least there is no 
evidence supporting this hypothesis, its impact on the ability of governments to 
conduct redistribution is less favourable.” Feld then continues to discuss proposals to 
mitigate the problem, in particular residence requirements and delayed integration in 
welfare systems. Even there we find support for some form of tax coordination at 
least for multinationals, as multinational firms can easily shift profits to jurisdictions 
with low tax rates. In fact, profit shifting leads to redistribution, because tax payments 
are foregone and no relocation of firms occurs. 
The taxation of multinationals should indeed be a main objective of European 
corporate income tax coordination. There are three main arguments, namely the 
provision of a level playing field for business activities, non-discrimination of cross 
border activities, and the mitigation of fiscal externalities. Whilst the latter has been 
discussed at length throughout this paper, the prior two deserve some consideration. 
Non-discrimination is certainly a central aspect of the common market, and can be 
traced back to the founding document of the European Union, the Treaty of Rome. 
However, it is a political argument more than an economic argument. The provision 
of a level playing field, and can be traced back to the concept of Ordnungspolitik, 
which received some attention in the German theoretical debate on economic policy. 
It postulates that competition between firms is always beneficial, and should therefore 
be a goal of economic policy. If there is already competition within countries, 
international competition cannot provide any more efficiency gains. 
The arguments in favour of consolidation typically are a reduction in compliance 
costs for firms, the ensuring of international loss offset, reduced monitoring and 
control costs of tax authorities, the elimination of fiscal externalities, and compliance 
with capital export neutrality. (Genser, 2005) On the other hand, it distorts the optimal 
locational choice of firms (Pethig and Wagener, 2003) and requires national tax 
authorities to share information. However, following the Parent/Subsidiary Directive 
(1969 and 1990), the Merger Directive (1969 and 1990) and the Arbitration Directive 
(1974 and 1990), we find that national tax authorities need to share information even 
under separate accounting. 
 7. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper was to review. The main argument of this paper has been that 
capital tax coordination is predominantly an issue of distribution. In particular, capital 
tax coordination can alter the vertical distribution of income between the production 
factors capital and labour. Capital is in perfectly elastic supply in a small open 
economy. Therefore the tax incidence falls to the immobile factor, labour. By contrast, 
capital is in inelastic supply at the international level. Hence coordinated taxation of 
capital can shift income from labour to capital. If distribution is the main concern, then 
tax coordination will only arise if countries have similar preferences over redistributive 
policies, at least under the current European political institutions of unanimity.  
This paper has also shown that fiscal externalities are a concern, and capital tax 
coordination could also be motivated on efficiency grounds. The literature is divided 
on the source of the inefficiency. One strand of the literature focuses on economic 
externalities, whereas the other on political externalities, insinuating a political 
process that is at least in part driven by self-interest.  
This distinction makes all the difference in the position towards tax coordination in the 
two strands of literature. A benevolent view on public decision-making implies that tax 
coordination is favourable both to internalize fiscal externality and engage in 
redistributive policies. By contrast, a negative perspective on the political process 
induces support of political competition to minimize rent seeking. Despite these 
differences, a large body of literature agrees that consolidation of tax bases for 
multinationals, as suggested by the Bolkestein report, is indeed a worthwhile cause. 
The coordination of the tax base does not necessarily imply a reduction of 
competition over tax rates. Indeed, with a common tax base, information over 
favourable tax regimes is more readily available, and hence competition in tax rates 
may get fiercer. In addition, this may induce further competition in subsidies, tax 
holiday regulation, and tax enforcement, as suggested by Feld in this volume. 
Finally, we have to be aware that the elimination of capital tax competition does not 
necessarily preclude tax competition. We know from national accounting identities 
that capital income plus labour income plus investment is equivalent to consumption 
plus total savings, or rK + wL + I = Y = C + S. (Cnossen, 2001) Rearranging this 
equation, we find that the capital income tax base, and hence capital income 
taxation, can be replicated with a consumption tax, a tax on net savings and a wage 
subsidy, rK = C - wL + (S - I). Instead of capital tax competition, competition could 
merely shift to commodity tax competition (see Lockwood, 2001) accommodated by 
an increase in labour taxation.  
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